AUTOPREGUNTAS
Based on a comprehensive review of our case history and all assembled documents, we can now articulate the powerful implications of our strategic questions. These questions are designed to be unanswerable in any satisfactory way by the perpetrators, thereby exposing the fundamental weakness of their position and compelling them toward a mediated resolution.
When we ask the Spanish public authorities to produce the due diligence reports that justify awarding RRF contracts to companies with a known history of competition law sanctions, they will be unable to comply. The evidence we have gathered proves a pattern of such awards, which is in direct contravention of both EU regulations and Spanish national law. Any document they produce would be an admission of their failure to conduct proper checks, confirming the core of our claim for maladministration and breach of their duty to ensure the sound financial management of EU funds.
In response to our question about what new mechanisms will fix the “significant opacity” identified by the European Court of Auditors, any proposal for internal reform will lack all credibility. Their existing systems have demonstrably failed. This question is constructed to corner them into acknowledging that only an external, independent body can restore trust and implement a genuinely transparent framework. This logically positions our Unsolicited Project Proposal as the necessary solution they themselves require. By forcing this admission, we transition from being a critic to being the provider of an essential governance tool.
When we challenge the corporate beneficiaries on the declarations they made regarding their compliance history, we place them in a legal paradox. An admission of failing to disclose their sanctions opens them to liability for fraudulent misrepresentation. A claim that they did disclose this information confirms the government’s willful breach of law, strengthening our case against the public authority. Similarly, when we ask them to assess the stability of their contracts in light of international legal precedents where awards from flawed procurement processes have been nullified, we are introducing a material risk that their investors and leadership cannot ignore. We are making it clear that their multi-million euro contracts are built on a legally precarious foundation.
Ultimately, these lines of inquiry all lead to the same conclusion, which is embedded in our final questions to both parties. They have not calculated the true cost of a multi-front legal and reputational battle, and they cannot implement a durable solution without a facilitator who both understands the intricate details of the problem and holds the trust of the aggrieved class of businesses. The purpose of asking these questions is to have them arrive at this conclusion themselves, making our proposal for mediation appear not as a demand, but as the only logical and prudent way forward.
Based on the strategic questions we have developed, we can now anticipate the responses, or lack thereof, from the perpetrators and understand how they strengthen our position for both litigation and mediation. These questions are designed to dismantle their defenses and logically guide them toward a mediated resolution facilitated by COCOO.
When we ask the Spanish public authorities to provide the due diligence reports that justify awarding massive public contracts to companies with a history of sanctions for bid-rigging, they will be unable to produce any credible documentation. Any report they could offer would not withstand scrutiny against the standard of “sound financial management” required by EU law. Their inability to provide a satisfactory answer would serve as powerful evidence of either gross negligence or willful misconduct, cornering them into a position of significant legal liability. This forces them to acknowledge a critical failure in their control systems.
Consequently, when we inquire about the new transparency mechanisms they will implement to fix the “significant opacity” noted by the European Court of Auditors, their proposals for internal reform will lack credibility. The system they currently oversee has already failed. This question is structured to lead them to the unavoidable conclusion that only an independent, external body with deep knowledge of the existing failures can design and oversee a credible solution. This naturally positions COCOO and our proposed transparency framework as the most logical and effective path forward.
Similarly, our questions to the corporate perpetrators, like Dragados and Sacyr, are designed to place them in an untenable legal position. When we demand to see the declarations they made during the tender process regarding their full compliance history, they have no good answer. If they failed to disclose their sanctions, they are exposed to claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. If they admit to disclosing them, they confirm the government knowingly breached public procurement law. Furthermore, when we challenge them on the legal stability of their contracts in light of international precedents where agreements tainted by fraud have been nullified, we introduce a significant and material risk to their balance sheets. This makes the prospect of a confidential settlement far more appealing than risking the potential invalidation of their entire contract.
Ultimately, these lines of inquiry converge on a single strategic point. The final questions we pose to both parties—about the prohibitive cost of litigation versus a swift settlement, and the need for a trusted facilitator—are rhetorical by design. The logical answer is that a protracted, public legal battle would be disastrous for all involved, and that a durable solution requires a mediator who understands the nuances of the dispute and holds the trust of the aggrieved parties. By systematically exposing their legal vulnerabilities, we are not just preparing for a court battle; we are building an undeniable case for why all parties should come to the mediation table with COCOO as the essential facilitator for a comprehensive and final resolution.
Based on the entirety of our findings, there is a very strong possibility that many of the public contracts awarded by Spanish authorities and funded by the RRF are unlawful and could be declared invalid. The collective tortious harm suffered by the class of excluded competitors stems directly from this unlawfulness. The grounds for challenging the validity of these contracts are numerous and substantial.
The most probable ground for invalidity is that the contracts are void for illegality and being contrary to public policy. A contract to perform an unlawful act or one that fundamentally contravenes the principles of public order is unenforceable. Our evidence indicates that public funds have been awarded to companies with a documented history of anti-competitive behaviour, including bid-rigging. Awarding contracts under such circumstances directly violates Spanish and EU public procurement and competition laws, which are designed to protect the public interest and ensure the sound management of taxpayer money. An agreement that is the fruit of a process tainted by such serious prior misconduct can be argued as being void from its inception.
A second critical ground is that the Spanish public authorities may have acted ultra vires, or beyond their legal powers. A public body’s authority to award contracts is not absolute; it is strictly conditional upon following the mandatory rules set out in law. By ignoring the ineligibility of certain bidders due to prior sanctions, and by circumventing transparent and competitive procedures, the contracting authorities have arguably failed to comply with the essential conditions of their power. When a public body acts outside its prescribed legal authority, its decisions, including the awarding of a contract, can be rendered null and void.
Furthermore, the validity of these contracts can be challenged on the basis of vitiated consent. If the winning companies failed to disclose their full history of sanctions or made other false representations to appear eligible, they may have fraudulently induced the public authority to enter into the contract. A contract based on fraud is voidable at the option of the defrauded party, which in this case would be the state, acting on behalf of the public interest we aim to protect.
Finally, at a European level, the entire procurement process appears to have breached the fundamental Treaty principles of transparency, equal treatment, and non-discrimination. These are not mere guidelines; they are foundational legal requirements for all public procurement within the single market, especially when EU funds are involved. Contracts awarded in defiance of these principles are unlawful and can be challenged as such, providing another powerful basis for our collective action.
To further strengthen our case and apply maximum leverage, it is crucial to understand the international web of contracts and partnerships involving the primary Spanish companies at the heart of our investigation. Their activities and relationships abroad may reveal patterns of behaviour and create opportunities for us to build a wider coalition of aggrieved parties.
Our research indicates that the major Spanish construction firms operate on a global scale, often in partnership with other international companies and in jurisdictions with major public spending programmes. ACS Group, through its subsidiaries including Dragados, has a vast presence in North America and Australia, securing major public infrastructure contracts for projects like metro lines and highways. Similarly, Sacyr is heavily involved in public concessions across Latin America and in European countries like Italy, Portugal, and the UK, often through joint ventures with local firms. A key example is their partnership with the Northern Irish company Farrans Construction. Ferrovial also has a significant international footprint, notably in the UK through its past management of Heathrow Airport and in the US and Canada with major toll road projects. Their Polish construction subsidiary, Budimex, is another key international entity. FCC Construcción has also secured large-scale public works in the Middle East and Latin America.
In the energy sector, the international connections are equally significant. Iberdrola, a major recipient of funds for green transition projects, is a global energy leader with critical subsidiaries in other countries. These include ScottishPower in the United Kingdom and Avangrid in the United States, both of which are major players in their respective national energy markets. This means Iberdrola regularly engages with public regulators and competes for contracts in these key jurisdictions. The Spanish utility Endesa is majority-owned by the Italian energy giant Enel, placing it within a multinational structure with operations and partnerships across Europe and Latin America.
This international dimension is strategically vital. It allows us to investigate whether the anti-competitive and opaque practices we have identified in Spain are part of a broader corporate pattern. Furthermore, it provides us with a list of other countries and foreign companies—both partners and potential competitors—that may have been affected by or have knowledge of these practices. By identifying and potentially collaborating with these international stakeholders, we can apply multinational pressure and significantly amplify the scope and impact of our mediation and redress campaign.
A detailed review of the new documents on dispute resolution provides us with powerful new legal arguments and strategic tools that significantly strengthen our position and refine our mediation strategy. These materials allow us to present mediation not merely as a preference, but as the only logical and commercially prudent path for the Spanish authorities and the implicated companies.
First, we can now introduce a significant new risk for the companies that have improperly received RRF funds. The precedent set in the UK High Court case concerning Nigeria and P&ID demonstrates that arbitration awards, even those worth billions, can be overturned by national courts if the underlying contract was procured through bribery or other severe abuses of process. This provides us with a powerful argument: any contracts won through the non-competitive and opaque processes we have identified are inherently unstable and vulnerable to legal challenge. We can now credibly warn these companies that their perceived gains are insecure and that a mediated settlement is the only way to achieve legal and financial certainty.
Second, the documents on collective redress and the assignment of claims provide us with a highly effective mechanism for consolidating our legal power. Rather than navigating the complex procedural hurdles of a representative action, we can implement an “assignment model”. This involves having the aggrieved SMEs in our class formally assign their individual claims for damages to COCOO. This action, which is supported by EU law and practiced in several member states, allows us to bundle these individual claims into a single, formidable legal action. This makes the threat of litigation far more tangible and potent, increasing the pressure on the opposing parties to agree to mediation.
Finally, the materials reinforce the value of a comprehensive settlement, which is the ultimate goal of our mediation process. We can argue to all parties that a single, global settlement is vastly preferable to years of costly, piecemeal litigation that carries significant reputational risk and legal uncertainty. Drawing on the OECD’s analysis of settlements in cartel cases, we can show that this is a mature and efficient way to resolve complex commercial and regulatory disputes. Our mediation, therefore, offers a path to finality, allowing the government to demonstrate its commitment to reform and enabling all companies involved to move forward with clarity.
Based on your directive to pivot our strategy towards mediation, I have processed the new attachments and can now outline a redrafted Unsolicited Proposal (USP) and a sequence of steps designed to position COCOO as the indispensable mediator in this case. Our leverage remains our privileged knowledge, but our approach will now be one of constructive, neutral facilitation aimed at achieving a binding settlement.
Our new USP will be framed as a Proposal for a Structured Mediation Process to Resolve Systemic Irregularities in RRF Public Procurement. This document will be formally presented to the key Spanish ministries involved. The proposal will begin by neutrally defining the dispute, not as an accusation, but as a set of documented risks and inconsistencies that jeopardise the financial integrity of the RRF and harm a significant class of legitimate European and Spanish businesses. It will reference the evidence we have gathered from official sources as the basis for a necessary and urgent dialogue.
The core of the proposal will be our unique qualification to act as mediator. We will argue that due to our extensive, multi-sectoral investigation, COCOO is the only entity with a comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between the procurement laws, the specific corporate actors, and the systemic loopholes that have led to the current situation. We are not just a neutral third party; we are a subject-matter expert facilitator. Our privileged knowledge allows us to guide the parties towards a practical and effective solution far more efficiently than any generic mediation service. The goal of the mediation, as our proposal will state, is to co-create a “Framework for Future Compliance and Redress,” which would include a fair compensation mechanism for the aggrieved class and the implementation of our proposed solutions, such as a transparency platform, as a mutually agreed-upon outcome.
The steps to implement this strategy will be as follows. First, we will issue a formal, confidential invitation to the responsible Spanish Ministers, proposing mediation as a constructive alternative to protracted and reputationally damaging proceedings before the European Commission, OLAF, and the European courts. This initial communication will underscore the significant legal and financial risks of inaction, thereby creating a powerful incentive to engage.
Second, simultaneous with our formal approach, we will adapt our public-facing media campaign. The call to action will shift from “Join our collective claim” to “Support our call for a fair and mediated settlement.” This serves to rally our class of aggrieved businesses, demonstrating to the government that we represent a substantial and organised coalition seeking a constructive resolution.
Third, should the government agree to proceed, we will execute the formal mediation process as outlined in the principles you provided. This will begin with the signing of a tripartite Mediation Agreement between the Spanish authorities, representatives of the aggrieved business class (facilitated by COCOO), and COCOO as the mediator. This agreement will establish the rules of the process, ensure confidentiality, and define the scope of the dispute, setting the stage for a successful negotiation and a lasting, binding settlement.
The two-pronged approach is strategically sound. On one hand, we will continue our macro-level campaign to highlight systemic risks, creating the political will for public bodies to seek external expertise in financial oversight and procurement integrity. On the other hand, the tactic of using a highly-targeted, low-value Unsolicited Proposal for a scoping study is an excellent tactical entry point. By framing our proprietary knowledge and analytical tools as a unique asset, we can justify a direct award for an initial assessment, bypassing a lengthy competitive tender and getting our foot in the door.
As we move to the implementation phase of our media campaign, the focus now shifts to crafting the specific messaging for each platform. Our objective is to translate our complex legal and evidence-based findings into compelling narratives that resonate with our target audience of aggrieved businesses, while also capturing the attention of media and political stakeholders.
For LinkedIn, our campaign will be anchored in professionalism and expertise to attract high-quality class members. We will begin by publishing an article on the COCOO page titled: “The €140 Billion Question: An Analysis of Systemic Risks in the Allocation of Spain’s EU Recovery Funds.” The introduction will set a serious tone, stating that while the RRF promises a new era of growth, our analysis reveals significant transparency and competition law deficits that disproportionately harm small and medium-sized enterprises. This article will serve as our cornerstone piece of content, which we will then promote using targeted ads with direct copy: “Was your construction or technology firm unfairly excluded from a recent RRF public tender in Spain? You are not alone. Join our confidential collective action to seek financial compensation for your business.” These ads will direct targets to a secure lead generation form.
On the X platform, our approach will be geared towards creating public pressure and making our findings newsworthy. We will launch a detailed thread beginning with an assertive hook: “How do companies with a history of competition law sanctions end up receiving millions in EU recovery funds in Spain? We investigated. Here’s what we found. 🧵” Each post in the thread will reveal a different facet of our findings, using simple infographics to name the sanctioned companies alongside the contract values they received. We will tag relevant journalists, Spanish Members of Parliament, and MEPs on the budgetary control committees to ensure the information reaches those who can amplify it and demand official accountability.
For our Meta campaign on Facebook and Instagram, we will focus on targeted, narrative-driven advertising to connect with business owners on a more personal level. The ads will tell a relatable story: “You invested weeks preparing a competitive bid, only to see the public contract awarded to a corporate giant with a questionable track record. This is a reality for many SMEs trying to access Spain’s EU recovery funds. We are a group of businesses fighting back against this unfair system.” These ads will be precisely targeted to individuals with job titles like “CEO” or “Owner” in our key sectors and will direct them to a secure page on our website where they can learn more about joining our collective action confidentially.