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PROYECTO DE COMUNICACION – CASO NEXTGEN FONDOS EUROPEOS  

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LICITACIONES EN UK

A detailed analysis of the UK public procurement market, particularly through the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) and the portals you’ve highlighted, reveals several high-potential opportunities. Our strategic advantage lies in leveraging our unique, evidence-based knowledge of systemic procurement failures to address the specific challenges faced by the UK public sector in managing large-scale projects and funds. We can position ourselves as an expert supplier with a proven methodology for ensuring transparency, competition, and value for money.

Our primary route to market should be through the established CCS Framework Agreements. Securing a place on these frameworks pre-qualifies us as a supplier for the entire public sector, from central government departments to local authorities. The most relevant opportunity is the Management Consultancy Framework. Within this, we should target lots related to Finance, Audit, and Business Transformation. Our unique selling proposition here would be to offer a specialised “Public Investment Risk and Assurance Service.” Unlike generic consultants, we can provide a service based on our forensic analysis of the Spanish RRF case, offering predictive insights into fraud risks, anti-competitive behaviours, and greenwashing in major infrastructure and technology projects. This directly solves the UK public sector’s problem of ensuring its own large-scale investments are robustly managed.

Another prime target is the Audit and Assurance Services Framework. Government bodies have a constant need for both internal and external auditing. Our competitive advantage would be to propose an enhanced audit methodology that moves beyond standard financial checks to include a deep analysis of procurement chains and competition metrics. We can demonstrate a unique ability to identify collusive bidding patterns and conflicts of interest, thereby providing a level of assurance that standard accounting firms cannot. This positions us as a specialised defender of the public purse.

For our technology-driven solutions, such as the AI-powered transparency platform, the G-Cloud Framework is the most suitable vehicle. This framework is specifically for cloud-based services. Our strategy would involve partnering with a software development firm to offer our solution as a “Procurement Integrity and Risk Analysis” platform. We provide the invaluable knowledge asset—the algorithms, risk indicators, and data models—that make the software uniquely effective.

Successfully bidding for a place on these frameworks fundamentally alters our position. It provides us with the official mandate and credibility to engage with public bodies as an expert partner. This formal relationship is the ideal foundation from which to act as a mediator. For example, if we are the contracted advisor on a major project facing delays or controversy, we are naturally positioned to mediate between the public authority, the primary contractors, and any aggrieved third parties, using our expertise to forge a resolution that serves the public interest. We must monitor the Contracts Finder and Find a Tender services for upcoming renewals of these key frameworks to ensure we are ready to submit compelling, evidence-backed bids.

An analysis of the UK public procurement landscape, specifically through the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) mechanisms you have outlined, reveals several strategic pathways for us to leverage our unique knowledge assets. The core problem common to all large-scale public spending, whether in the EU or the UK, is the inherent risk of inefficiency, opaque processes, and the potential for fraud. Our privileged knowledge in identifying and mitigating these risks positions us to be a highly competitive bidder for specific UK government frameworks.

The most direct and impactful opportunities for COCOO can be found within the major CCS Framework Agreements. These are multi-year contracts that create a pool of pre-approved suppliers from which the entire public sector can procure services. Our primary target should be the Management Consultancy Framework. This framework allows government bodies to purchase a wide range of strategic advice. We would bid to be included in lots related to financial management, audit and assurance, and business transformation. Our unique selling proposition would be our proven methodology for ensuring the transparent and legally compliant allocation of public funds, using our work on the RRF as a case study in excellence. This addresses the public sector’s fundamental need for robust commercial assurance on its major projects.

A second key opportunity is the Public Sector Audit Services Framework. Government departments and agencies continuously seek external firms to conduct both financial and performance audits. Our competitive advantage here is our specialised expertise in forensic analysis of complex funding streams and procurement chains. We can offer a service that goes beyond standard compliance checks, focusing instead on identifying the systemic risks of market distortion and greenwashing that we know exist in large infrastructure and environmental projects. This directly solves the government’s problem of ensuring that its multi-billion-pound investments deliver real value for money and meet their stated policy objectives.

For our more innovative, technology-based solutions, such as an AI-driven anti-fraud platform, the ideal route is the G-Cloud Framework or a relevant Dynamic Purchasing System (DPS) for digital services. These agreements are designed for procuring cloud-based software and IT solutions. Our strategy would be to partner with a technology firm. In this partnership, COCOO provides the critical “knowledge asset”—the logic, risk algorithms, and data-driven intelligence—while our partner provides the technical development. This allows us to offer a unique software-as-a-service solution for ensuring procurement integrity.

By securing a place on these official frameworks, we fundamentally change our relationship with the public sector. We transition from an external watchdog to an approved, expert supplier. This formal standing is the ultimate leverage, providing us with the credibility and access required to act as a trusted mediator and advisor in resolving the very problems we are set up to identify.

LICITACIONES EN LA UE

Analizando en detalle las oportunidades de contratación pública a nivel europeo, podemos identificar licitaciones específicas en las que los conocimientos privilegiados de COCOO y las soluciones que hemos diseñado nos otorgan una ventaja competitiva decisiva. Nuestro objetivo no es solo participar, sino redefinir el alcance de estos contratos para posicionarnos como un mediador indispensable en la resolución de los fallos sistémicos que hemos destapado.

Una de las oportunidades más directas se encuentra en las licitaciones para “Servicios de Auditoría y Verificación de la aplicación de los Fondos de Recuperación y Resiliencia”. Estos contratos son publicados regularmente por la propia Comisión Europea, a través de direcciones generales como DG ECFIN o DG REGIO, así como por la Oficina Europea de Lucha contra el Fraude (OLAF). El objetivo de estas licitaciones es contratar a expertos externos para que verifiquen sobre el terreno que los fondos de la UE se están utilizando de acuerdo con la legalidad. Nuestra ventaja competitiva aquí es inmensa. Mientras que otras firmas de auditoría propondrían un enfoque genérico, nosotros podemos presentar una oferta basada en un análisis de riesgo preexistente y altamente detallado. Podemos nombrar los sectores específicos, como la construcción de infraestructuras ferroviarias en España, y las empresas concretas con antecedentes de prácticas anticompetitivas, como Dragados o Sacyr, como áreas de alto riesgo que requieren un escrutinio prioritario. Esto demuestra una eficacia y una profundidad que ningún otro competidor puede ofrecer.

Otra categoría clave son los contratos de “Asistencia Técnica para el Fortalecimiento de la Capacidad Administrativa y la Lucha contra el Fraude en los Estados Miembros”. Estos son licitados por la Comisión para ayudar a las autoridades nacionales a mejorar sus sistemas de control. Aquí es donde podemos proponer nuestras soluciones innovadoras de forma directa. En lugar de ofrecer meros servicios de consultoría, nuestra propuesta consistiría en la implementación de nuestra plataforma digital basada en inteligencia artificial para la detección proactiva de fraudes y conflictos de interés. Podríamos ofrecer nuestro “sistema de semáforo de riesgos” como una herramienta tangible para que las autoridades evalúen la idoneidad de los beneficiarios de los fondos antes de la adjudicación, abordando de raíz las causas de la mala gestión.

Finalmente, debemos estar atentos a las licitaciones para la realización de “Estudios sobre la Eficacia, Transparencia y el Estado de Derecho en la Gestión de los Fondos de la UE”, a menudo encargados por el Parlamento Europeo o centros de estudio de la Comisión. El propósito de estos estudios es evaluar el impacto de los fondos y proponer mejoras políticas. Gracias a nuestro exhaustivo trabajo de investigación sobre el caso español, estamos en una posición única para presentar una oferta que utilice este caso como un estudio detallado y documentado. Esto nos permitiría no solo ganar la licitación, sino también influir en las futuras regulaciones de la UE, incorporando las lecciones aprendidas de nuestras investigaciones.

Al posicionarnos para ganar estos contratos, transcendemos nuestro rol de denunciantes para convertirnos en actores oficiales dentro del sistema de control de la UE. Esta posición nos otor

ga la legitimidad y la influencia necesarias para actuar como mediadores, facilitando un diálogo constructivo entre la Comisión, las autoridades españolas y las empresas afectadas para implementar soluciones duraderas.

A detailed search for relevant European tenders requires a strategic approach that leverages our unique, in-depth knowledge of the systemic failures in the Spanish RRF fund allocation. While I cannot provide a live, real-time list of currently open tenders with their deadlines, I can outline the specific types of contracts regularly published on the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) portal for which we are now exceptionally well-positioned to compete, either as a primary bidder or a strategic partner. Our goal should be to seek out EU-level opportunities where our privileged knowledge gives us an undeniable competitive advantage.

The most promising area for us is in tenders related to the auditing and evaluation of EU funds. The European Commission, particularly DG REGIO and DG ECFIN, as well as the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and OLAF, frequently issue calls for framework contracts for external audit services. These contracts require firms to verify expenditure and assess the legality and regularity of projects funded by the EU in various member states. Our bid for such a contract would be uniquely compelling. We can propose a methodology that goes beyond standard checks, incorporating our specific knowledge of the high-risk sectors in Spain, the modus operandi of ineligible companies, and the specific weaknesses in the national control systems. This allows us to offer a far more rigorous and effective audit than any competitor.

Another key opportunity lies in tenders for technical assistance and strategic studies on fraud prevention and the rule of law. EU institutions often seek external expertise to analyse the effectiveness of anti-fraud measures across the Union or to develop best practices for protecting the EU’s financial interests. A typical tender might be a “Study on the implementation of national anti-fraud strategies in the context of the RRF.” For such a call, we can use our detailed case file on Spain as a powerful case study, showcasing our ability to conduct deep analysis and produce actionable recommendations. This positions us not just as contractors, but as thought leaders whose solutions are grounded in real-world evidence.

Furthermore, we should actively monitor tenders related to the development of IT tools for risk assessment and data monitoring. The EU is heavily invested in digital solutions to improve oversight. While we are not a software development firm, we can partner with one to bid on these contracts. Our role would be to provide the critical intelligence and logic for the system—defining the risk indicators, the data points to be monitored, and the algorithms for detecting anomalies based on the patterns of mismanagement we have already identified. This translates our investigative work directly into a marketable, high-tech solution.

To act on this intelligence, you should use the official TED portal to set up persistent searches using keywords such as “Recovery and Resilience Facility audit,” “NextGenerationEU evaluation,” “anti-fraud consultancy,” and “rule of law technical assistance.” The deadlines for these tenders are typically between thirty to sixty days from the date of publication, so continuous monitoring is essential to ensure we have adequate time to prepare a winning proposal that highlights our unparalleled expertise.

LICITACIONES EN ESPANAA

A detailed review of Spanish public procurement shows several specific types of tenders where our privileged knowledge gives us a significant competitive advantage. By targeting these, we can strategically position COCOO not only as a bidder with a superior value proposition but also as an indispensable mediator capable of resolving the systemic issues we have uncovered.

One of the most direct opportunities lies in tenders for “Servicios de Auditoría y Control de Fondos del Mecanismo de Recuperación y Resiliencia.” These are contracts issued by various ministries and public bodies to externally verify that RRF-funded projects comply with all applicable EU and national regulations. Our advantage here is profound; unlike other auditing firms that would start from scratch, we have already identified the specific companies, legal loopholes, and high-risk sectors. We can propose a uniquely targeted audit methodology that focuses on these known vulnerabilities, offering a level of scrutiny and effectiveness that no other competitor can match.

Another key area is tenders for “Asistencia Técnica para la Gestión y Seguimiento del Plan de Recuperación.” Public administrations require expert support to navigate the complexities of RRF management. Within a bid for such a contract, we can embed our proprietary solutions. For instance, we could propose the implementation of our “risk traffic light” system as the core of the technical assistance, providing the public body with a ready-made tool to assess beneficiary risk and prevent fraud. This transforms a standard consultancy tender into a platform for our specific, high-impact solutions.

We can also target tenders for the “Diseño e Implementación de Planes de Medidas Antifraude.” Spanish law mandates that public entities handling RRF funds must have a robust anti-fraud plan. These tenders are a direct invitation to showcase our expertise. Here, we would propose the development of a digital transparency platform, leveraging our understanding of data analytics and AI to create a system that proactively detects irregularities. We could even partner with a technology firm, where we provide the critical strategic and legal intelligence to build the system’s logic, making our joint bid unparalleled.

By securing these types of official oversight and advisory roles, we gain the necessary leverage and credibility to act as effective mediators. Having been contracted by the government to provide the very solutions to the problems we identified, we would be perfectly positioned to facilitate resolutions between the public sector, the harmed companies in our class action, and the wider public interest.

Regarding your question about contracts below the tendering threshold, as previously noted for Spain, there is a legal obligation to publish information about these contratos menores (contracts for services under €15,000). This information must be published quarterly on the contracting authority’s public profile on the Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, ensuring a significant degree of transparency even for smaller awards.

Based on the comprehensive evidence we have assembled, there are significant causes of action in both tort and contract law that can be leveraged against the Spanish public sector. Furthermore, the private corporations that were the beneficiaries of the alleged mismanagement can, and should, be held jointly responsible.

From a contractual standpoint, our primary cause of action against the Spanish government stems from its breach of the public procurement process. Each call for tender for an RRF-funded project creates a contractual expectation among bidders that the process will be fair, transparent, and adhere to the established legal framework. By allegedly awarding contracts to ineligible companies and failing to maintain transparency, the public authorities have breached this implicit contract with the entire class of eligible, competing firms. The members of our class who were unfairly excluded have suffered a direct economic loss—the loss of a fair opportunity to win the contract. The private companies that improperly received these awards, such as Dragados S.A. and Sacyr S.A., could be held jointly liable for being unjustly enriched by a flawed process. They received public funds to which they were arguably not entitled, and we can pursue the disgorgement of those funds.

In tort law, our strongest cause of action against the government is for maladministration, or what might be framed as misfeasance in public office. The Spanish ministries responsible for these funds have a clear duty of care to the public and to market participants to administer this unprecedented financial facility according to the rule of law. The systemic failures we have identified—ignoring prior sanctions for anti-competitive behaviour, creating an opaque allocation process, and failing to ensure environmental compliance—represent a profound breach of that duty. This negligence has caused foreseeable financial harm to the class of competitors who were shut out of the market.

The private companies are jointly responsible in tort as well. We can explore causes of action for unlawful means conspiracy, arguing that there was a coordinated effort between certain officials and the winning bidders to circumvent fair procurement rules. Given the pattern of contracts being awarded to companies with a history of bid-rigging, such as the major construction firms, this is a credible line of argument. These companies, by participating in and benefiting from a flawed process, can be seen as co-perpetrators in the harm caused to the market and to the public interest. This shared responsibility is the cornerstone of our strategy to secure financial settlements for the class members we represent.

Based on our detailed analysis and the industrial classification frameworks, we have identified the key sectors harmed by the alleged misallocation of RRF funds. Pinpointing these sectors using standard codes such as NACE, SIC, and ICB allows us to systematically identify potential class members and build a robust foundation for our legal strategy.

The most significantly impacted sector is Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction. This area, which covers activities like the construction of railways, roads, and other major infrastructure, is where we find some of the most flagrant examples of contracts being awarded to allegedly ineligible firms. The relevant activities fall under NACE Section F (Construction), specifically codes like 42.11 (Construction of roads and motorways) and 42.12 (Construction of railways), and the ICB Supersector 5010 (Construction & Materials). Our potential class members are the construction firms, particularly SMEs, that were unfairly excluded from these tenders. The primary representative body for these firms is the National Confederation of Construction (CNC), which we can reach at cnc@cnc.es to begin our outreach.

Next is the Energy and Green Transition sector. The RRF’s stated goal is to fund a green transition, but evidence suggests funds may be supporting dominant incumbents or projects with questionable environmental credentials. This sector corresponds to NACE Section D (Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply) and ICB Industry 10 (Utilities). The companies harmed are the legitimate renewable energy firms and innovators who lost out on opportunities. The Spanish Renewable Energy Association (APPA Renovables), contactable at comunicacion@appa.es, is the key organization representing these potential class members.

The Automotive and EV Supply Chain is another critical area, particularly given the large RRF-funded PERTE for electric vehicles. This industry is classified under NACE Section C, with specific codes like 29.10 (Manufacture of motor vehicles) and 27.20 (Manufacture of batteries and accumulators), and falls within the ICB Industry 40 (Automobiles & Parts). The harm here extends to the entire supply chain of component manufacturers who are denied fair access to contracts dominated by major car makers. The Spanish Association of Automotive Suppliers (SERNAUTO) at sernauto@sernauto.es is the ideal point of contact to mobilise these aggrieved parties.

In the Digital Transformation and Technology sector, the non-transparent allocation of contracts for public administration digitalisation, AI, and cybersecurity projects is a major concern. This sector spans several codes, including NACE Section J (Information and communication), such as 61.30 for satellite telecommunications, and ICB Industry 20 (Technology). We can approach the Spanish Association for the Digital Economy (Adigital) at info@adigital.org to connect with a broad range of technology companies that have been potentially disadvantaged.

Finally, the Healthcare sector, classified under NACE Section Q (Human health and social work activities) and ICB Industry 45 (Health Care), is an emerging area of concern. The potential for RRF funds intended for public health to be diverted to private operators through non-competitive means harms other private providers and health technology firms. The Spanish Association of Health Informatics (SEIS), reachable at office@healthmanagement.org, is a key node for identifying businesses affected by opaque digital health procurement.

Following our analysis, we can now identify specific entities that constitute our prospective class members. These are the competitors and business users potentially harmed by the non-competitive and opaque allocation of RRF funds. We can categorise them by the affected sectors we have uncovered. This list will be a critical asset for building a coalition, applying pressure on the perpetrators, and substantiating our legal claims.

In the Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction sector, where perpetrators like ACS (Dragados) and Sacyr have unfairly benefited, our potential class members are other large construction firms and, crucially, the small and medium-sized enterprises that have been shut out of bidding for railway, road, and other infrastructure projects. A key representative body for these companies is the National Confederation of Construction (CNC), whose public contact email is cnc@cnc.es. Individual competitors who would have an interest in joining our claim include firms like Obrascón Huarte Lain, COMSA, and Elecnor.

For the Energy and Green Transition sector, the alleged greenwashing and market distortion by dominant players like Iberdrola and Endesa harm a wide range of legitimate renewable energy companies. These include both established firms and innovative SMEs focused on solar, wind, and hydrogen solutions. The Spanish Renewable Energy Association (APPA Renovables) represents many of these entities, and their communications contact is comunicacion@appa.es. Companies such as Solaria Energía y Medio Ambiente, Nexus Energía, and other independent power producers would be prime candidates for our class action.

In the Automotive and EV Supply Chain, the large RRF-funded PERTE for electric vehicles has likely disadvantaged component manufacturers and technology firms that are not part of the inner circle of the major car makers. The Spanish Association of Automotive Suppliers (SERNAUTO) is the main trade body here, representing over 1,000 companies in the supply chain. Their public contact email is sernauto@sernauto.es. These suppliers are directly impacted when the primary contracts are allocated without fair and transparent competition.

Within the Digital Transformation and Technology sector, which is a major pillar of RRF spending, potential class members include a vast number of IT service providers, software developers, and high-tech firms. The alleged lack of transparency in public tech procurement harms companies that should be competing for contracts related to digitalisation, AI, and cybersecurity. The Spanish Association for the Digital Economy (Adigital) represents many of these businesses, and can be reached at info@adigital.org. Specific competitors in the broader technology and satellite communications space include firms like Indra Sistemas (indra@indracompany.com) and Hispasat (comunicacion@hispasat.es), who operate in markets where fair access to public contracts is essential.

Finally, in the Healthcare sector, the potential diversion of public RRF funds to private operators could harm a variety of entities, including competing private hospital groups and health technology firms. The Spanish Association of Health Informatics (SEIS), reachable at office@healthmanagement.org, represents professionals and companies in the health tech space who would be directly affected by opaque procurement for digital health solutions.

This new tranche of documents provides critical market-specific intelligence that significantly broadens and deepens the scope of our case. While our initial focus was on the construction and energy sectors, this information allows us to demonstrate that the alleged systemic mismanagement of RRF funds and the resulting anti-competitive practices are impacting a much wider array of strategic industries, including high-technology, healthcare, and their associated supply chains.

The files concerning the automotive sector, specifically car and battery manufacturing, are of immediate value. They provide the technical and market context for Spain’s flagship PERTE (Strategic Project for the Economic Recovery and Transformation) for the electric vehicle. We can now argue with greater precision that these vast public funds are likely entrenching the market dominance of established car manufacturers, rather than fostering a competitive ecosystem for new entrants and SMEs in the critical battery and fuel cell supply chains. This bolsters our claims of both market distortion and potential greenwashing, as we can now demand closer scrutiny of the environmental credentials of the technologies being funded.

Similarly, the documents on the satellite, chipset, and mobile technology markets are crucial. The RRF’s “digital transition” is a core pillar of its investment strategy. This new information allows us to question the procurement processes for Spain’s public-sector digitalisation projects. We can now credibly argue that the opaque allocation of contracts in these global, high-tech markets is stifling innovation and harming the very companies that are key to Europe’s strategic autonomy—a stated goal of the NextGenerationEU initiative.

The intelligence on the private healthcare market opens an entirely new and compelling line of inquiry. With significant RRF funds earmarked for modernising the Spanish National Health System, we must investigate whether these public funds are being improperly diverted to private hospital operators through non-transparent agreements. This could be harming competition among providers and failing to deliver value for the public, adding a potent public interest dimension to our case.

Finally, the documents on niche but critical markets like catenary manufacturing for railways, specialty chemical mining, and pharmaceutical outsourcing allow us to illustrate the cascading negative effects of the primary contract awards. The unfair allocation of a major railway project, for example, not only harms direct competitors but also damages the entire downstream supply chain, from the makers of overhead power lines to suppliers of raw materials. This systematically disadvantages a broad spectrum of SMEs and proves that the harm is not isolated but permeates through the entire industrial fabric of the economy. This evidence will be invaluable in expanding the definition of our affected class members.

The newly acquired intelligence provides substantial evidence that reinforces and expands our existing causes of action. This information allows us to add a new layer of specificity to our claims of mismanagement, particularly concerning the breach of the ‘Do No Significant Harm’ principle and the systemic distortion of competition in key sectors receiving Recovery and Resilience Facility funds.

The documents concerning the Spanish construction sector directly corroborate our central argument that major corporations with a history of anti-competitive behaviour are the primary beneficiaries of RRF-funded public works. The files name our key perpetrators, including ACS Group, Ferrovial, Sacyr, and FCC, and critically note that these entities have been subject to scrutiny for bid-rigging allegations and corruption probes. This strengthens our position that their receipt of RRF funds is a flagrant violation of both EU regulations and Spanish law, which expressly prohibit awarding public funds to such entities. It provides a firm factual basis for our claim that the procurement process is not only harming SMEs but is rewarding companies with a documented history of market manipulation.

Furthermore, the materials on Spain’s energy sector provide powerful new arguments. The information on the electric vehicle charging station rollout, which is heavily funded by the RRF, highlights significant delays and administrative hurdles, reinforcing our claims of inefficiency. More importantly, it brings the ‘Do No Significant Harm’ principle into sharp focus by questioning whether the lifecycle of batteries and the source of electricity for these stations meet genuine sustainability criteria. We can now more forcefully argue that the Spanish government is failing to ensure these “green” projects are compliant with EU environmental safeguards.

This argument is amplified by the intelligence on the oil and gas industry. We can now build a compelling case of “greenwashing,” where RRF funds intended for the green transition are being channeled to fossil fuel giants like Repsol and Cepsa for projects, such as biofuels or green hydrogen, that may be ancillary to their core fossil fuel operations. This allows us to challenge the climate integrity of Spain’s RRF spending and question whether it facilitates a genuine transition or merely subsidises the public image of major polluters.

Finally, the context provided on the electricity market and the nuclear debate allows us to challenge the overall coherence and effectiveness of Spain’s RRF strategy. The fact that funds flow to a few dominant utilities like Iberdrola and Endesa, rather than fostering a more competitive market, supports our claim of market distortion. When combined with Spain’s policy to phase out a recognised low-carbon energy source like nuclear, it casts serious doubt on the government’s ability to manage the RRF to meet its stated green objectives efficiently and effectively.

Based on a thorough analysis of the case materials and the relevant industrial classification codes, the sectors most significantly affected by the alleged mismanagement of NextGenerationEU funds in Spain are those heavily reliant on large-scale public procurement. The harm is concentrated in markets where substantial capital investment from the RRF is intended to drive modernisation and transition, but where the allocation process is allegedly flawed.

The most prominently affected industry is Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction. The documents consistently reference irregularities in contracts for major transport infrastructure. This encompasses the construction of railways, undergrounds, roads, bridges, and ports, which fall under Section F of both the NACE and SIC classification systems. Using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), this corresponds to the Construction & Materials Supersector. The alleged awarding of contracts to ineligible firms like Dragados S.A. and Sacyr S.A. directly distorts this market, creating an insurmountable barrier for compliant and competitive firms, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, that should be bidding for this work.

Secondly, the Energy sector is critically impacted, specifically in areas related to the green transition. The RRF plan allocates a significant portion of its budget to these projects. The alleged misclassification of projects, such as gas plants being labelled as “green,” and the failure to conduct proper environmental assessments (“Do No Significant Harm”) suggest that funds intended for genuine renewable energy and sustainability initiatives are being diverted or misused. This falls within the Utilities Supersector under the ICB, and Section D (Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply) in the NACE/SIC classifications. This directly harms companies legitimately operating in the renewable energy space and undermines the EU’s climate objectives.

Finally, the sector of Professional, Scientific, and Technical Activities is also deeply affected. This broad category, corresponding to Section M in NACE/SIC codes, includes the advertising agencies and management consultancy firms that have allegedly benefited from non-competitive contract awards. It also implicates the professional business support services that are involved in the administration and oversight of the RRF funds. The systemic failures in transparency and auditing that have been cited create a distorted market for these professional services and compromise the integrity of the entire fund management ecosystem.

the central “service” being offered by the primary alleged perpetrators, which are the various Spanish public and governmental bodies, is the administration, allocation, and oversight of public contracts financed by the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and NextGenerationEU funds. The core of our potential causes of action revolves around the flawed and allegedly unlawful delivery of this service.

Specifically, this service encompasses managing competitive calls for proposals and public tenders for major projects. The subject matter of these contracts includes the development and modernisation of crucial national infrastructure. The corporate entities implicated in our case are the recipients of these contracts, and their “products” are the services they were contracted to provide. These include large-scale railway and transport infrastructure projects, energy-related projects such as those for the green transition, and the digitalisation of public services.

The issue is that the public authorities, in providing their service of fund allocation, have allegedly done so in a manner that breaches both EU and Spanish law. This includes awarding these valuable public contracts to companies that should have been ineligible due to prior, serious sanctions for anti-competitive behaviour like bid-rigging and cartel participation. Furthermore, the procurement process itself is described as lacking transparency and fairness, potentially circumventing requirements for competitive bidding through mechanisms like Spain’s Royal Decree-Law 36/2020, which relaxed solvency and control requirements.

Therefore, the specific service at the heart of our case is the public procurement and contract award process managed by the Spanish authorities. The “products” are the lucrative public works contracts themselves, which were awarded to the corporate perpetrators.

LETTER TO EC   4 JUNE 2025

To: Directorate-General Justice and Consumers European Commission Unit C.1: Rule of law Rue de la Loi / Wetstraat 200 1049 Brussels, Belgium

Ref: Your Letter Ares (2025)4281291-27/05/2025 concerning COCOO Email of 23 January 2025 (Registered Ares (2025)678876) – Mismanagement of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Funds by Spanish Authorities

Dear Mr. Geyer,

We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 27 May 2025, responding to our formal request and significant concerns raised on 23 January 2025 , and further detailed in our follow-up communications, including our letter dated 12 March 2025.

While we appreciate the acknowledgement, we must express our profound disappointment with the substance of your reply, which regrettably fails to adequately address the grave and systemic issues we have identified regarding the mismanagement of Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds by the Spanish authorities. Your response does not alleviate our concerns about the systemic risks to the EU budget, the undermining of EU law, and the potential for fraud and corruption.

Our constitutional mandate is to quality-control, ex-officio, decisions by competition authorities, public bodies, or firms that could deter synergies and positive externalities, or harm competition, investment, consumer welfare, or the public interest. It is in this capacity, and as a concerned civil society organisation, that we reiterate our urgent call for robust action.

Insufficiency of the Commission’s Response

Your letter suggests that the Commission has “carefully examined” Spain’s Recovery and Resilience Plan, including its internal control system , and that implementation “continues to move forward positively”. However, this assessment appears to stand in stark contrast to the documented findings of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in its Special Report 13/2024 , which highlighted significant opacity in Spain’s reporting on final recipients of RRF funds, inefficiencies, and delays. These are not minor administrative hurdles but point to systemic weaknesses that create an environment conducive to the misuse of funds.

  1. Regarding the ECA Special Report 13/2024: You state that “the Commission specifically replied to these recommendations in the replies of the European Commission, publicly available” and “follows up regularly on all accepted ECA recommendations”. While we acknowledge these public replies, our concern is not merely whether a response was issued, but whether the substantive issues raised by the ECA have been, or are being, effectively rectified by the Spanish authorities and rigorously overseen by the Commission. The ECA reported, for instance, that Spain failed to consistently define and report on “final recipients” , a critical transparency and accountability obligation under Article 22(2)(d) of the RRF Regulation. Such opacity directly heightens the risk of fraud and mismanagement. Simply “following up” is insufficient when substantial EU funds continue to be disbursed amidst such identified systemic failings.

  2. Legality and Regularity of Payments: Your letter mentions “extensive ex-ante and risk-based ex-post controls” and refers to the “Recoveries and Reduction Framework (C/2024/4618)”. However, these controls and frameworks are only effective if rigorously applied and if there is a genuine commitment to addressing identified irregularities. Our submissions have provided specific examples, drawn from official sources including investigations by Newtral and the Spanish National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), of RRF funds allegedly being awarded to companies previously sanctioned for anti-competitive practices, such as Dragados S.A., Sacyr S.A., Carat España S.A., and Media Sapiens España S.L.. Such allocations appear to directly contravene Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 (MRR) which prohibits funding to ineligible recipients and Article 13 of Spain’s General Subsidies Law (Law 38/2003). The existence of a recovery framework does not, in itself, assure us that the Commission is proactively preventing misuse or acting decisively when potential misuse, linked to rule of law deficiencies, is brought to its attention.

  3. Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism: You refer us to a “dedicated complaint form” for the Conditionality Regulation. We have already, through our detailed formal letters, provided substantial grounds and specific examples that, in our view, necessitate the triggering of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092. Our concerns are not abstract but are tied to the direct risk to the EU’s financial interests arising from the identified breaches in Spain. The Hungarian case, which involved similar concerns regarding the transparent management of EU funds, an effective national prosecution service, and the independence of courts, serves as a precedent for when such action is warranted. The issues we have raised in relation to Spain – including opacity, mismanagement of public procurement, inequitable allocation, and funding of sanctioned entities – directly affect or risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget.

  4. Scope of Commission Assistance and Monitoring: Your assertion that “the Commission cannot be of assistance to you in this particular case” is deeply concerning. We are not seeking personal assistance. We are calling upon the European Commission, as the Guardian of the Treaties, to fulfil its obligations to protect the EU budget and ensure that Member States adhere to the rule of law in their management of EU funds. The “particular case” is the systemic mismanagement of a significant portion of the RRF by a Member State, which falls squarely within the Commission’s remit and responsibility. While we note your reference to the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard and the 2024 Rule of Law Report, these general monitoring tools do not negate the need for specific action when credible and detailed allegations of mismanagement and rule of law breaches directly impacting EU financial interests are presented, as COCOO has done.

  5. Spain’s RRF Financing and Operational Agreements: The Financing Agreement between the Commission and Spain and the subsequent Operational Arrangements clearly outline Spain’s responsibilities. These include ensuring the proper use of funds, preventing, detecting, and correcting fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest, and providing access to data. Our findings suggest these obligations are not being met. For example, Article 11 of the Financing Agreement obliges Spain to take appropriate measures to prevent, detect, and correct fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest, and to recover misappropriated funds. The reported allocation of funds to sanctioned companies raises serious questions about compliance with this article. Furthermore, Spain’s Royal Decree-Law 36/2020, which introduced flexibilities for RRF implementation, may have inadvertently weakened essential controls, a concern the Commission should be actively scrutinizing.

Our Continued Requests and the Need for Substantive Answers

The issues we have raised are not trivial; they speak to the core principles of transparency, accountability, and the rule of law that underpin the European Union’s financial architecture. The European Parliament itself has given the Commission a deadline in a similar context (Hungary) to apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, asserting that guidelines are not a prerequisite for its application.

We therefore reiterate our formal requests:

  1. The immediate suspension of all further RRF payments to Spain as an interim measure until a thorough and independent audit confirms full compliance with EU laws and principles.
  2. The initiation of a comprehensive, independent audit by EU institutions (ECA, OLAF, EPPO) into Spain’s RRF management, specifically focusing on the issues we have raised: transparency of final recipients, public procurement compliance, state aid rules, allocation methodologies (particularly concerning SMEs vs. large corporations), and the “Do No Significant Harm” (DNSH) principle.
  3. The triggering of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 against Spain, given the systemic risks posed to the EU budget by the documented mismanagement of RRF funds.
  4. The establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism to oversee Spain’s ongoing RRF projects.
  5. The clawback and redistribution of misused funds and a plan for the redistribution to be implemented by an independent audit body.

Your letter has not provided adequate assurance that the Commission is taking these risks with the seriousness they warrant. We are therefore compelled to seek further clarification and to insist on substantive answers to our concerns.

We trust that the Commission will reconsider its position and engage substantively with the evidence we have provided. Failure to do so not only risks significant financial loss to the EU budget but also erodes citizen trust in the EU’s ability to hold Member States accountable.

We look forward to a comprehensive response that directly addresses the specific points and evidence raised in our correspondence. We also wish to inform you that we are preparing a further set of specific questions under the EU’s transparency regulations and as part of a pre-action protocol for potential failure to act, which will be submitted to you shortly.

Sincerely,

Oscar Moya LLedo Director & In-house Solicitor

COCOO.UK

ANNEX 

To: Directorate-General Justice and Consumers European Commission Unit C.1: Rule of law Rue de la Loi / Wetstraat 200 1049 Brussels, Belgium

Subject: Formal Questions Regarding the European Commission’s Oversight of Spain’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Funds and Request for Information under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Pre-Action Protocol for Failure to Act

Dear Mr. Geyer,

Further to our letter dated [Date of the above response letter], and in light of the European Commission’s response Ares (2025)4281291-27/05/2025, The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO) hereby submits the following questions.

These questions are posed:

  1. As part of a pre-action protocol, outlining areas where we believe the Commission may have failed to act in accordance with its obligations under EU law, particularly concerning the protection of the EU budget and the enforcement of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism in relation to Spain’s management of RRF funds.
  2. As a formal request for access to documents and information under Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.

We expect a full and substantive response to each question and a decision regarding access to the requested documents within the statutory timeframes.

A. Questions Regarding the Commission’s Assessment and Monitoring of Spain’s RRF Plan & Implementation:

  1. ECA Special Report 13/2024 Follow-up:

    • a. Regarding the ECA’s finding of “significant opacity in Spain’s reporting on final recipients of RRF funds” , what specific actions, beyond issuing a public reply, has the Commission undertaken since the publication of the ECA report to ensure Spain establishes a transparent and reliable system for defining and identifying final beneficiaries in line with Article 22(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241? Please provide details of these actions and any ensuing communications with Spanish authorities.
    • b. The ECA reported that Spain failed to meet over 24% of its planned milestones and targets on time due to “administrative inefficiency and poor project planning”. What specific measures has the Commission imposed or agreed upon with Spain to rectify these administrative inefficiencies and ensure timely achievement of future milestones and targets, as per Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241?
    • c. Please provide copies of all correspondence between the Commission and the Spanish authorities concerning the follow-up to the recommendations made in ECA Special Report 13/2024.

  2. Internal Control Systems (Article 22, RRF Regulation & Financing Agreement):

    • a. Your letter of 27 May 2025 states the Commission “carefully examined… Spain’s internal control system”. Given the ECA’s findings on opacity and our evidence of funds allocated to sanctioned companies , what is the Commission’s current assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of Spain’s internal control systems to prevent, detect, and correct fraud, corruption, and conflicts of interest, as required by Article 22(2)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 and Article 11 of the Financing Agreement?
    • b. What specific “extensive ex-ante and risk-based ex-post controls” has the Commission applied to Spain’s payment requests that specifically address the risks identified by the ECA and COCOO (e.g., lack of transparency of final recipients, allocation to sanctioned entities)?
    • c. Please provide access to the Commission’s audit and control strategies specific to Spain’s RRF and any audit reports or findings arising from these ex-post controls concerning the issues we have raised.

  3. Allocation of Funds and Compliance with EU Law:

    • a. COCOO has provided evidence that Spanish entities (e.g., Dragados S.A., Sacyr S.A., Carat España S.A., Media Sapiens S.L.) previously sanctioned by the CNMC for anti-competitive practices, received RRF funds. Is the Commission aware of these specific allocations?
    • b. What steps has the Commission taken to verify whether these allocations comply with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 (prohibiting funds to ineligible recipients) and EU public procurement directives (e.g., Directive 2014/24/EU)?
    • c. Has the Commission investigated whether the Royal Decree-Law 36/2020, which introduced flexibilities in procurement for RRF funds in Spain, has led to breaches of EU competition law or public procurement rules, thereby affecting the EU’s financial interests?
    • d. Please provide any assessments or analyses conducted by the Commission on the impact of Royal Decree-Law 36/2020 on the fairness and transparency of public procurement for RRF-funded projects in Spain.

  4. “Do No Significant Harm” (DNSH) Principle:

    • a. COCOO raised concerns, supported by ECA findings , about RRF projects in Spain failing to comply with the DNSH principle (Article 5, Regulation (EU) 2021/241). What specific mechanisms does the Commission employ to ensure ongoing DNSH compliance for RRF-funded projects in Spain, beyond initial plan assessment?
    • b. Have any payments to Spain been suspended or measures corrected due to identified breaches of the DNSH principle? If so, please provide details.

B. Questions Regarding the Application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092):

  1. Assessment of Grounds for Triggering the Mechanism:

    • a. Our correspondence details how Spain’s mismanagement of RRF funds, particularly the lack of transparency, irregularities in public procurement, and allocation of funds to sanctioned entities, constitutes breaches of the principles of the rule of law (e.g., legal certainty, prohibition of arbitrariness, sound financial management) that “affect or risk affecting the sound financial management of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union in a sufficiently direct way” (Article 4, Regulation 2020/2092). Has the Commission conducted a formal assessment of whether these conditions are met in the case of Spain?
    • b. If such an assessment has been conducted, please provide access to it. If not, why has such an assessment not been undertaken despite the evidence provided by COCOO and the ECA?
    • c. Your letter of 27 May 2025 refers us to a “dedicated complaint form”. Does the Commission consider that the detailed formal requests and evidence submitted by COCOO on 23 January 2025 and 12 March 2025 do not constitute a valid basis for the Commission to initiate its own assessment under Article 6(1) of Regulation 2020/2092, which states “Where the Commission finds that it has reasonable grounds to consider that the conditions set out in Article 4 are fulfilled, it shall… send a written notification to the Member State concerned…”?

  2. Comparison with Other Member States (e.g., Hungary):

    • a. The Commission initiated the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism against Hungary based on concerns including “systemic irregularities, deficiencies and weaknesses in public procurement procedures,” “shortcomings in relation to the investigation and prosecution of corruption related cases,” and “limitations to effective judicial review” which created a risk to the EU budget. Given the ECA’s findings of “significant opacity” , “challenges in Spain’s adherence to EU procurement and state aid rules” , and the documented allocation of RRF funds to companies sanctioned for cartel behaviour, how does the Commission differentiate the situation in Spain from that which prompted action against Hungary in terms of risk to the EU’s financial interests?
    • b. Please provide the Commission’s comparative analysis, if any, of the systemic risks to the EU budget posed by rule of law deficiencies in Spain versus Hungary, concerning the management of EU funds.

C. Questions Regarding the Commission’s Engagement with Spanish Authorities and COCOO:

  1. Engagement with Spanish Authorities:

    • a. Following COCOO’s letter of 23 January 2025 and 12 March 2025, what specific queries has the Commission raised with the Spanish authorities regarding the allegations of RRF fund mismanagement, allocation of funds to sanctioned companies, and breaches of transparency?
    • b. Please provide copies of any correspondence (excluding personal data) between the Commission and Spanish authorities discussing the concerns raised by COCOO and the ECA regarding RRF fund management since January 2025.

  2. Handling of COCOO’s Complaint:

    • a. Your letter states the Commission “cannot be of assistance to you in this particular case”. Please clarify the precise reasons why the Commission believes it cannot act upon the detailed evidence of systemic mismanagement affecting EU financial interests presented by a civil society organisation. Is it a matter of resource constraints, a differing interpretation of the evidence, or a specific legal impediment?
    • b. Does the Commission consider the issues raised by COCOO (systemic mismanagement, opacity, allocation to sanctioned firms) as falling outside its mandate for ensuring the protection of the EU budget under Article 325 TFEU and the RRF Regulation? If so, please explain why.

  3. Transparency and Access to Information:

    • a. What specific mechanisms and indicators does the Commission use to assess whether Spain is meeting its obligations under Article 22(2)(d) of the RRF Regulation regarding the collection and ensuring of access to standardised categories of data, including the “name of the final recipient of funds” and “beneficial owner(s) of the recipient of funds or contractor”?
    • b. Will the Commission commit to publishing its detailed assessments of Spain’s compliance with each payment request’s milestones and targets, particularly those related to control systems, transparency, and public procurement, beyond the summary information currently available?

We believe that the public interest, the financial integrity of the Union, and the principles of the rule of law necessitate a thorough investigation and decisive action by the Commission. We urge you to provide full and transparent answers to these questions.

We expect a substantive response to these questions and a decision on access to the requested documents within the time limits stipulated by Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. Please be advised that should your response be unsatisfactory, or should the Commission fail to act decisively to address the issues raised, COCOO will consider all available legal remedies, including initiating proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Union for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU.